Pros
The product truly is spectacular (for now, new leadership seems determined to drive it off a cliff) New re-brand might be promising but too early to tell at this point. TB seems genuinely invested in a profitable exit for the business.
Cons
TLDR: This is not a place to grow your career. If you got laid off, have been out of work for a while and need a job, take the paycheck. Just don’t expect to get anything else from this place. The company’s direction and strategy is not one the exudes confidence. Leadership is too busy pointing fingers at one another to buy themselves a few more quarters than actually fixing any problems. Truly some of the most laughable executive communication I’ve ever seen! Comp is very uncompetitive. If you get any sort of equity, it’s not even liquid until that exit event 2-4 years down the road, and you most likely won’t be able to keep it if you leave before then. Benefits are also really bad outside of a solid 401k match. --- Textbook Case of How to Ruin a SaaS Company. Step 1: Bring in a Big 3 Consulting Firm (McKinsey), and have them recommend to downsize headcount by roughly 1000 (about 1/3 for reference). They come up with a strategy that is rebuilding the product and how we sell it, so that we’re virtually indistinguishable from our smaller competitors who are point solutions. Instead of continuing to compete with SAP and Oracle. Step 2: Instead of putting funds towards resources/programs that would help with this massive product and strategy shift. Move your headquarters from SF to Miami so the CEO has an excuse to take his Ferrari out of his garage (still keep the old SF HQ too). Step 3: Instead of hiring some lower level/ senior level ICs to retool for Anaplan 2.0. Hire a bunch of Senior Director and VP+ level talent that is so bad that you actually wish your layoffs weren’t so drastic because now you have an attrition problem that’s out of control, because new management is so cancerous. Step 4: Set historically aggressive revenue targets for revenue, while completely changing our sales and product strategy to one that deters the pursuit of larger deals in the pursuit of smaller deals at a presumably higher volume (yet to be seen 1+ years and still waiting). Step 5: Act surprised that we continuously miss these high revenue targets, so you end up just slashing pro forma costs so deep that a psycho in a slasher film would tell you to take it easy. Step 6: Hope that a transaction happens enough for this once innovative company to not completely cave in on itself before it reaches the light at the end of the tunnel.
